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Abstract. The security and usability issues associated with passwords have en-
couraged the development of a plethora of alternative authentication schemes. 
These aim to provide stronger and/or more usable authentication, but it is hard 
for the developers to anticipate how users will perform with and react to such 
schemes. We present a case study of a one-time password entry method called 
the Vernitski Authentication Grid (VAG), which requires users to enter their 
password in pairs of characters by finding where the row and the column con-
taining the characters intersect and entering the character from this intersection. 
We conducted a laboratory user evaluation (n=36) and found that authentication 
took 88.6s on average, with login times decreasing with practice. Participants 
were faster authenticating on a tablet than on a PC. Overall, participants found 
using the grid complex and time-consuming. Their stated willingness to use it 
depended on the context of use, with most participants considering it suitable for 
accessing infrequently used and high-stakes accounts and systems. While using 
the grid, 31 out of 36 participants pointed at the characters, rows and columns 
with their fingers or mouse, which undermines the shoulder-surfing protection 
that the VAG is meant to offer. Our results demonstrate there cannot be a one-
size-fits-all replacement for passwords – usability and security can only be 
achieved through schemes designed to fit a specific context of use. 
1 Introduction 
The pressure to replace passwords with other authentication solutions has been 
growing. The number of passwords that the user has to create and remember has been 
steadily increasing leading users to create weaker but more memorable ones, hand their 
lives over to a password manager, write passwords down or simply reuse the same cre-
dential or a variation for multiple systems (Florêncio, Herley, & Van Oorschot, 2014). 
Many new authentication schemes have been created with the aim to make authentica-
tion easier and/or more secure. But with the exception of the Android Unlock Pattern, 
none of these replaced passwords – rather, widely adopted solutions have added to the 
password scheme to create 2-factor authentication, such as Google Authenticator or the 
2-factor solutions deployed in online banking (Krol, Philippou, De Cristofaro, & Sasse, 
2015). From the security point of view, a password scheme devised today would need 
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to protect against passwords being collected through malware, phishing and shoulder-
surfing. In this paper, we present our preliminary lab-based evaluation of a scheme that 
was designed to protect against these types of attacks – the Vernitski Authentication 
Grid (VAG) (Vernitski, 2015). 
The VAG was created by one of the authors, the mathematician Alexei Vernitski. 
Users choose a password consisting of an even number of letters and/or digits. The 
entry of this password is through a 6x6 grid (the order of characters is random and 
reshuffled on each authentication) and the user needs to enter the characters of their 
password in pairs. They need to find the row that contains the first character and the 
column that contains the second character and enter the letter/digit that is in their inter-
section. Then this is repeated for each next pair of consecutive characters until the end 
of the password. 
We do not consider the VAG a graphical password since there is no graphical ele-
ment, such as a picture (Biddle, Chiasson, & Van Oorschot, 2012), that the user would 
need to remember. Instead they are asked to remember a password and then enter it 
using a grid. The mechanism is a form of challenge-response (C-R) authentication. The 
aim of the grid is to guard against shoulder-surfing and key-logging. It can protect the 
password at three stages: (1) at entry in a case when the interface cannot be trusted, for 
example, when using an unknown computer, (2) at entry when the physical environ-
ment is hostile, for example, in the presence of a potential shoulder-surfer and (3) in 
transit when communication can be eavesdropped on. Capture of the secret password 
shared between user and system is made more difficult by the characters in the grid 
being reshuffled each time. If the attacker has a key-logger installed on the users’ com-
puter, all they receive will be a set of random-looking characters. A statistical security 
analysis of the VAG was conducted by Papanicolaou (2013).  
Another potential use case for the grid would be as back-up or very infrequent au-
thentication – such as annual tax returns. Long periods of not recalling a password or 
backup credential lead to high failure rates. To increase memorability of the shared 
secret, users could pick a password with high personal entropy (Ellison, Hall, Milbert, 
& Schneier, 2000) – a word or phrase that is hard to guess, but meaningful to the user, 
and strongly embedded in biographical memory.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we review relevant 
existing work. In Section 3, we outline the set-up of the study followed by a presenta-
tion of both qualitative and quantitative results in Section 4. We discuss our findings in 
Section 5, and conclude and provide recommendations in Section 6. 
2 Related work 
There is a large body of research looking at graphical passwords, a survey by Biddle, 
Chiasson and Van Oorschot (2012) provides an overview of the schemes and their eval-
uations. Although the VAG is not a graphical password, some of the graphical pass-
words studied were grid-based which can make their findings relevant to our evalua-
tion. GrIDsure is one such example, users are asked to memorise a pattern and then 
when authenticating they receive a grid filled with digits and need to enter the digits 
that correspond to their pattern. Brostoff, Inglesant and Sasse (2010) looked at the us-
ability of GrIDsure and found that in nearly 18% of usages, participants were trying to 
enter the PIN on the grid directly instead of typing it. This undermines the security 
property offered by the grid, namely resistance to shoulder-surfing. 
New authentication schemes were also shown to alter user behaviour when accessing 
systems. Brostoff and Sasse (2000) found that participants logged in with one third of 
the frequency when they authenticated using a grid of Passfaces® rather than pass-
words, because the former took significantly longer. In a study by Steves et al. (2014), 
participants reported they did not follow their natural workflow but batched multiple 
activities on the same system together to save on authentication time and workload. 
With the emergence of touchscreen devices, we are increasingly moving away from 
a traditional screen and keyboard set-up to virtual keyboards. Previous studies have 
demonstrated that password entry on touchscreens can be significantly more difficult 
and time-consuming (Greene, Gallagher, Stanton, & Lee, 2014). Schaub, Deyhle and 
Weber (2012) investigated the usability and security of six types of virtual keyboards. 
They showed that the keyboards differed in the usability of password entry (entry time, 
accuracy) and susceptibility to shoulder-surﬁng. They found that keyboard designs with 
poor usability were more resistant to shoulder-surfing. Moreover, research has demon-
strated that the entry method affects users’ password choice and security as users 
choose passwords that are easier to enter on touchscreens (Yang, Lindqvist, & 
Oulasvirta, 2014).  
3 Study set-up 
3.1 Design 
The study was conducted in a laboratory with one experimenter and one participant 
at a time. There were two groups of participants: first one with 31 and the second one 
with 5 participants. The first stage was the same for both. After being introduced to the 
scheme, participants were asked to perform six logins. While the first group authenti-
cated six times during one lab session, the second group was asked to return for another 
session a week later where they were asked to perform another six logins. Each partic-
ipant in the first group ended their session with a brief interview where the experimenter 
asked them about their experience. 
3.2 Study goals and hypotheses 
The purpose of the study was to evaluate the user experience of the VAG both quan-
titatively and qualitatively. The study was meant to be a preliminary evaluation, looking 
at what users think of the grid, what the learning curve is to use the system and generally 
explore users’ experiences of authentication, their expectations and preferences. 
We devised the following hypotheses.  
H1: There will be a diﬀerence in the time that participants take to enter a password on 
a PC and a tablet. 
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H2: The time of entry will decrease the more practice participants have. 
H3: Authentication speed will depend on participants’ individual characteristics such 
as age, computer literacy and experience with touchscreens. 
 
3.3 Procedure 
Upon arrival, participants received an explanation of what the study will involve, 
they were asked to read an information sheet and sign a consent form. The workings of 
the grid were then explained to them using a laminated sheet of paper with a grid on it 
and a marker pen. Participants were then asked to enrol by setting up a username and 
password. The password had to be of an even number of characters. Once they were 
finished, they were asked to perform six logins overall: three on a PC and three on a 
tablet (order counterbalanced). After having performed these logins, participants were 
briefly interviewed about their experience and then asked to fill out a brief question-
naire about demographics as well as their computer literacy and cyber-threat exposure.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. A screenshot of the login page used in the study. The 
“Shuffle” option generates a new grid. 
3.4 Apparatus 
The prototype of the VAG used in the study (Fig. 1) was programmed in Java (using 
JSP/Servlet technology) and was linked to a MySQL database. The JQuery framework 
was also used to enhance the interactivity of the prototype and provide a better user 
experience. The study was performed on a PC running Windows XP using a 22″ mon-
itor with a resolution of 1920×1080 pixels and a 9.7″ iPad 2 with a resolution of 
1024×768. 
3.5 Participants 
The study was conducted in August 2013. The research was exempted from an ethics 
committee review. We recruited our participants through a participant pool at Univer-
sity College London. Anyone was welcome to participate as we did not set any require-
ments. Participants were paid £6 for their participation which took around 30 minutes. 
Overall, there were 36 participants in the study, 19 male and 17 female. Mean age was 
26.9 years (range: 20–49, SD=7.2). In terms of education, 28 participants had com-
pleted a university degree and 7 had A-levels (UK school leaving certification).  
4 Results 
Overall, across all participants, devices and trials, a login attempt (regardless of if 
successful or not) took 63.7s. However, in real life failed attempts to authenticate add 
to the time needed to access a system, therefore in our analyses we consider the cumu-
lative time needed for a successful login, which means we counted the times of failed 
attempts too. The cumulative average time for a login using the VAG across all partic-
ipants, devices and trials was therefore 88.6s (median=32.5). This average is skewed 
by some trials requiring several attempts. Therefore, to illustrate it better, we can say 
that 45% of logins took under half a minute, 70% under 1 minute, 79% under 1.5 
minutes and 85% under 2 minutes. Figure 2 shows login times across different trials 
and treatments. There were six logins and the number of attempts participants needed 
to successfully log in ranged from the required 6 to 14 (M=8.16, SD=2.11). On average, 
1.4 attempts were needed for a successful login (SD=0.8). Passwords chosen by partic-
ipants were on average 6.7 characters long (SD=1.24, range: 4–10). Out of 36 partici-
pants, 22 chose a 6-digit password, presumably influenced by the example password 
(zebra1) given by the experimenter which had 6 characters. 
4.1 Hypotheses 
We conducted a 2 (Device: PC, Tablet) × 6 (Trials) × 2 (Order: PC first, Tablet first) 
repeated measures ANOVA on the time needed to log in. There were significant main 
effects of Device (F(1,34)=12.6, p=0.001), Trial (F(2,33)=9.74, p=0.001) and Order 
(F(1,34)=9.8, p=0.004). There was a significant Device × Order interaction 
(F(1,34)=5.24, p=0.028) and Device × Trial interaction (F(2,33)=3.35, p=0.041). There 
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was a marginally significant Trial × Order interaction (F(1,34)=2.49, p=0.091). The 
three-way Device × Trial × Order interaction was non-significant (F<1).  
H1. Device type. We hypothesised that there would be a difference between how 
long participants would take on a PC and on a tablet. On average, our participants 
needed 118.8s to log in on a PC and 58.4s on a tablet (see Figure 2). The ANOVA test 
described earlier showed a significant main effect of Device indicating that participants 
were faster to log in on a tablet than on a PC. Post-hoc effects indicated this difference 
is statistically significant (U=319.5, p=0.02). H1 is therefore supported. 
H2. Practice. We hypothesised that login times would decrease the more practice 
our participants had. We could clearly see the learning curve in that participants’ login 
times were long at the first trial but decreased by the third trial. Upon switching to the 
other device, the login time was longer at first trial but decreased again with practice 
(see Figure 2). Participants who started on a PC were slower in their first trial than those 
who started on a tablet (U=39, p=0.008). After switching to the other device, partici-
pants who used a tablet first and switched to a PC were marginally faster than those 
who switched from a PC to a tablet but we did not find this difference to be statistically 
significant. The group that started with a tablet was on average authenticating faster 
than the group that started on a PC (U=3931, p<0.001). Assignment to these groups 
was random and we could not find any significant differences between the two groups. 
For our smaller sample of five participants who authenticated on two occasions, we 
hypothesised that participants would be faster in their second authentication session. 
For the first session, the average authentication time was 54.4s and for the second 39.9s. 
Each participant authenticated faster in the second session by an average of 14.6s. De-
spite this trend, we found this difference not be statistically significant (p=0.4). A larger 
sample of participants would be needed to be able to decisively prove or disprove this 
hypothesis. 
 
 
Figure 2. Login times in seconds presented across different trials. 
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H3. Personal characteristics. We hypothesised that age, computer literacy and expe-
rience with touchscreens would influence the speed with which participants authenti-
cated. We found a strong positive correlation between age and authentication time 
(r=0.42, p=0.01), the older our participants were the slower they authenticated. We 
found a moderate negative correlation between computer literacy and authentication 
time (r=-0.36, p=0.03), the more computer literate a participant, the faster they authen-
ticated. Finally, we did not find a statistically significant correlation between authenti-
cation speed on a tablet and experience with touchscreen devices (p=0.095). 
 
Apart from taking objective performance measures, we also conducted structured 
observations of participant behaviour while they authenticated. Out of 36 participants, 
31 pointed at the grid with their fingers or mouse when they were trying to find the row 
and the column where the characters of their passwords were. Three participants wanted 
to write their password down to facilitate breaking it down into pairs of characters. 
 
4.2 Interview results 
After the login tasks, participants were asked to share their experiences with us. The 
brief interviews were audio-recorded and later transcribed. The transcripts were ana-
lysed by one researcher using thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006). In what fol-
lows, we describe the themes that emerged from the analysis. 
Effort. Out of 31 participants, 16 emphasised the authentication scheme was com-
plicated. Eight participants said it required mental effort with P2 saying it was “too 
taxing on the mind”. P31 explained: “You do have to give full attention to it, so you 
can’t be doing any other stuff. You can’t be on the phone and be like: “Wait a minute I 
will just check my email. Oh, I have to login, hold for 5 minutes”. As this quote sug-
gests, participants also found the scheme time-consuming to use with overall 13 inter-
viewees stressing it required more time than traditional password entry. P7 emphasised 
that authentication should be fast especially if it guards access to a critical task: “If 
someone is going into cardiac arrest and those seconds matter, you need a procedure 
that’s going to be as quick as possible, not something that’s going to complicate things 
and, potentially, lose a life. I mean I realise logging on a system isn’t life and death, 
but sometimes it is that crucial that you get in as quickly as possible.” Both effort and 
time needed contributed to the feeling of frustration in some participants. Six of them 
stressed they found the grid frustrating, P7 explained: “It just seems like just the pass-
word itself is just far easier to remember and quicker to type in than having to find all 
these different letters and matching up and stuff. Like, if this was a real login for a site 
that I was on, and especially, you know, a business site or a professional site, it would 
drive me absolutely up the wall. I mean it would waste a lot of valuable time. So, like I 
don’t understand the purpose of it actually. It’s a big time waster.” 
Out of 31 participants, 10 emphasised the learning curve for the practice of how to 
use the grid. They mentioned using the grid became easier with time which we also see 
in the quantitative data. Nevertheless, P31 stressed that using the grid will never be as 
easy as entering a password since it cannot be automated: “Because you have to look 
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at, I mean it’s not something you can just memorise. If you just want to check email you 
memorise a password, or you check in some password, like I memorise the key strokes 
on my keyboard, that’s fine. I hate logging in using tablets and stuff but you know like, 
it’s usually like if I was checking email it’s usually just yeah, the pass code and a mobile 
and everything is there. But there is only your computer that can memorise your key-
board strokes, so you are like whatever, it’s muscle memory, you know your password. 
So that is like, oh no, you actually have to be awake and you have to do like puzzle type 
thing and then it’s annoying to do on an iPad, like say if you’ve just woken up or are 
really tired, then you can’t log in.” The difficulty P31 described is that a login using 
the grid requires thinking and focus whereas standard password entry can be done out 
of muscle memory and the user does not have to concentrate as much. 
High-value accounts. When asked if they would use this authentication scheme to 
log in in real life, participants generally gave varied responses. Out of 31 participants, 
15 stressed it depended on the context of use. In ten cases, participants emphasised their 
decision whether to use a grid would depend on what kind of an account they were 
trying to protect. Participants mentioned that better security would be needed for sys-
tems that hold sensitive or confidential information or that could lead to money loss as 
with access to online banking. P18 explained they would be more likely to use the VAG 
“for websites for banks and stock exchanges and all, where the real money is involved 
and your interest is at stake”. However, participants were not unanimous on this, four 
of them stressed their banking was secure enough already, P31 emphasised: “I’m fine 
with my bank account I think because I have a key and I have to press one number and 
then it gives you a number and I do that, so it’s not like I have additional mental stress. 
So, I wouldn’t use it for my bank. And anyway my bank is really good because I have 
had fraud twice and they return it, they block it when I have had fraud, so I am fine.” 
Nevertheless, P24 stressed they would prefer to use the grid since it does not require 
them to carry an additional device with them: “Definitely this one is easier for my bank 
account than my token because I have to have my token everywhere I go. This way I 
can do it anywhere in the world, any platform, yeah. So in terms of easier sign-in, it’s 
easier for bank account but in terms of security, I don’t know.” 
Experience of fraud. We also saw that prior experience of fraud influenced partic-
ipants’ stated willingness to adopt the VAG. P23 stressed: “If you could choose, so I 
would probably want something like this for like my bank account or actually just re-
cently my iTunes password was hacked, someone in Canada got my iTunes password 
so I had to close my account and cancel my credit card.” Conversely, P24 stressed they 
did not feel the need to strengthen their authentication through the use of a grid since 
they had not experienced fraud: “I might feel more receptive to taking this up if I had 
ever been a victim of password fraud before, but I haven’t. So, let’s say if I’d had my 
account hacked into before I would probably be much more receptive to using this one.” 
Frequency of use. Overall, nine participants made their willingness to adopt the 
VAG dependent on the frequency of use of the account it would protect. In four cases, 
participants stressed there was also a link between frequency of use and account im-
portance. They said they logged in to important accounts like banking less often than 
to their email, thus they would be more willing to put the effort into logging in for 
something that is high-value and infrequent. P23 explained: “Logging in to like my 
email, because I do it so frequently, I probably wouldn’t want to go through the hassle 
of that. But if it’s something more secure, I probably would.” P25 expressed a similar 
view saying: “I think that would take too long given how often I log into my email 
account.” 
Security. Overall, ten participants stressed the authentication grid was more secure 
than passwords. Five of them stressed the complexity made it more secure, P26 ex-
plained it is difficult to use for the user, so it must be for the attacker too: “It sounds 
like it’s safer yes, because it’s so complex, even for the user themselves.” 
5 Discussion 
We conducted a preliminary laboratory evaluation of the Vernitski Authentication 
Grid. A login took 88.6s on average. We found that the more practice our participants 
had, the faster they authenticated. Younger participants and those who had higher com-
puter literacy authenticated faster too. We did not find a statistically significant rela-
tionship between experience with touchscreen devices and authentication speed on a 
tablet. Interestingly, we saw that participants authenticated faster on a tablet and sub-
sequently faster on a PC. As mentioned earlier, previous research has shown that au-
thentication on touchscreens poses many usability challenges and it is surprising to see 
that a login to the VAG was faster on a tablet than a PC. 
We also saw that in theory this authentication scheme was meant to guard against 
shoulder-surfing but participant behaviour undermined this as participants pointed at 
the screen which might reveal to an attacker what the characters of their password are. 
In terms of qualitative feedback, half of our participants thought the authentication 
grid was complex and over one third described it as time-consuming. Interestingly, 
when asked about their willingness to use it in the future, 19 participants made their 
decision dependent on the context where it would be used. They thought the grid could 
add extra security for systems holding important and sensitive information like banking 
and systems that they do not access as frequently. They emphasised the notion that for 
frequent accounts the password is in their muscle memory and they can enter it fast 
without much thinking. In such a situation, the use of the grid would not be suitable as 
it requires focus and time. Especially since activities like email or Facebook are quick, 
users log in for a few minutes just to check if there has been anything new they need to 
attend to. This is in line with findings from previous studies. Brostoff and Sasse (2000) 
found that if a login procedure was elaborate and taking longer than password entry, 
participants logged in less often and once they logged in, they worked on the system 
for longer than those who logged in just using passwords.  
The differentiation that participants made in terms of account importance and fre-
quency of use is very interesting. Passwords were invented for a certain purpose (ad-
ministering a shared computer), then expanded to all systems as a one-size-fits-all so-
lution and nowadays virtually any Website offering some service requires users to reg-
ister with a username and password. Context of use is a fundamental HCI concept, 
however it is often forgotten by security researchers who do not account for differences 
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between individuals and contextual factors such as account type or frequency of use 
(Bonneau, Herley, Van Oorschot, & Stajano, 2012). 
We also saw that the stated willingness to use the VAG depended on participants’ 
risk perception. A participant who had experienced fraud stated they would be more 
likely to use it than a participant who had not. This is in line with previous studies where 
participants’ exposure to cyber-threats made them more cautious in subsequent online 
interactions (Krol, Moroz, & Sasse, 2012). 
Moreover, participants frequently compared using the VAG with entering traditional 
passwords. With an authentication time of 88.6s, the grid performed poorly in this com-
parison. To put this number into perspective, Roth, Richter and Freidinger (2004) tested 
several types of cognitive trapdoor games, that is PIN-entry methods offering resilience 
to shoulder-surfing. The longest average entry time for these was around 25s. To give 
another example, a standard login where the user has to enter a username and a pass-
word (both 8 characters long) was analytically predicted to take approx. 14.8s (Steves, 
et al., 2014). Additionally, our participants emphasised that using the grid required their 
undivided attention and they could not enter their password from muscle memory. It is 
a general problem with one-time credentials that their entry cannot be automated. 
5.1 Limitations 
The study was a preliminary laboratory evaluation of a new authentication mechanism. 
Such evaluations are multi-stage processes starting with a lab study, through a real-life 
deployment to an assessment post-adoption. Being the first stage in a long process our 
study had a range of limitations. We had a convenience sample of participants who 
knew what we were studying what might have made them behave in an unnatural way. 
Also, in real life a login is a gateway to some primary task and users’ focus is not on 
security but on that primary task. This is something we could not recreate in this study 
since the explanation of the workings of the VAG needed to be quite elaborate and 
hiding the fact that our study was looking at the grid was not possible. Finally, due to 
our recruitment through a university participant pool, our study suffers from a volunteer 
bias and we have a sample of relatively young and well-educated individuals. 
5.2 Future work 
Future work could continue with further stages of a usability evaluation of the VAG. 
Participant responses showed us in what kind of situations and for what types of sys-
tems the grid could be used and any future evaluations could focus on testing its de-
ployment in these real-life contexts. 
6 Conclusions 
As more and more services go online, reliable and efficient authentication will be-
come even more important in the years to come. Our study shows that users are unwill-
ing to use long and elaborate authentication procedures, such as the VAG studied here, 
unless it is for infrequent and/or high-value accounts. In line with the fundamental se-
curity principle saying that a security measure should be proportional to the value of 
the assets it is protecting, we believe that the strength of authentication should be pro-
portional to the importance/value of the accesses it is protecting. But the need for 
stronger authentication does not mean increasing the burden on users. The old myth 
that there is ‘usability-security tradeoff’ leads security experts to assume that it is OK 
for stronger security to require more effort. The myth even affects some users: in a 
recent study (Krol, Philippou, De Cristofaro, & Sasse, 2015), some of our participants 
consoled themselves that if the mechanism is demanding, it is secure. But in this current 
study, the majority of our participants were frank that they found the mechanism too 
demanding for regular authentication, and research to date has shown that authentica-
tion mechanisms that create too high a burden are circumvented, avoided or abandoned 
altogether by users (Steves, et al., 2014). Performing security tasks can give users the 
rewarding feeling that they have contributed to making their online interactions secure, 
but the effort has to be proportionate. The challenge is to be able to strike the right 
balance between providing users sufficient reassurance and demanding their attention, 
time and effort. 
6.1 Recommendations 
In light of the findings of our study, we suggest that grids like the VAG are too complex 
and time-consuming to use for frequent authentication. Having said that, there are spe-
cific contexts of use where the effort is seen to be proportionate. The VAG was faster 
on touchscreens, so it is more usable there. Most users struggle with infrequently used 
passwords, and there the use of a more memorable password can offset the longer input 
times. We also note that the scheme offers better security if used infrequently, since the 
attacker has to capture many authentication events to increase the likelihood of guess-
ing the password. 
There is no usable one-size-fits-all replacement for passwords – rather, mechanisms 
need to be selected to fit the devices, context of use (primary task, physical and social 
context), security requirements, and – where possible – preferences of individual users. 
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